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Deceit in Defense  
Investigations
BY PeteR A. JOY AND KeViN c. McMUNiGAL
Prosecutors and police routinely employ misrepresentation and deceit in undercover investigations. In cases ranging from drug 
distribution, prostitution, and sexual misconduct 
with minors to organized crime and terrorism, 
police and those cooperating with police deceive 
suspects and their cohorts about their identities 
and their intentions in order to gain information 
to help uncover past crimes and thwart future 
crimes. Frequently, such deceit helps reveal the 
truth about what criminals do and think.
May defense lawyers and investigators work-
ing for them employ similar tactics? Or should 
prosecutors be the only lawyers allowed to direct 
and supervise investigatory deception? In recent 
years, both debate and a divergence of views on 
this question have emerged. In this column we ex-
amine that debate, the arguments raised on both 
sides of it, and how various jurisdictions have an-
swered this question.
the Deceit conundrum
Consider the following facts based on a recent 
case. A lawyer’s client is charged with possessing 
child pornography on the client’s work computer 
and forcing a 12-year-old complainant to view 
that pornography. The client and complainant 
were acquainted through a mentoring program 
and the complainant often spent time at the cli-
ent’s place of work. The complainant knew the 
client’s computer password and offered to show 
the investigating officer the location of the porno-
graphic images.
The lawyer learns that the complainant has a 
history of both false sexual allegations and ac-
cessing pornography on the Internet. The lawyer 
strongly suspects the complainant rather than 
the client accessed and placed the pornography 
on the client’s computer. The lawyer wants to in-
spect the complainant’s home computer for simi-
lar pornography, which would help exculpate the 
client by suggesting that the complainant rather 
than the client was responsible for the pornog-
raphy on the client’s computer. The lawyer fears 
that to ask directly, though, will prompt the com-
plainant to destroy any pornographic images on 
the home computer.
The lawyer comes to you for advice. The lawyer 
wants to hire a private investigator to gain access 
to the complainant’s computer through deception. 
The private investigator would pose as a comput-
er consultant, contact the complainant’s family, 
claim to be conducting a survey of computer use 
by young people, and offer to swap the home com-
puter for a new laptop computer that would pur-
portedly allow the consultant to monitor the com-
plainant’s computer use. The lawyer plans to have 
an expert examine the computer for pornography. 
Is the lawyer’s plan ethically permissible? 
the Model Rules
A number of ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct bear upon the lawyer’s question about 
the use of deceit in investigations. Some directly 
address and categorically prohibit deceit. Others 
impose vicarious responsibility on lawyers for the 
acts of nonlawyers.
Deceit. Two key Model Rules directly address 
deceit. One is Model Rule 4.1, which states that 
“[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement 
of fact or law to a third person . . . .” The other 
is Model Rule 8.4, which provides that “[i]t is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”
Undercover investigations such as the one pro-
posed by our lawyer in the pornography scenario 
implicate both these provisions. Investigators going 
“under cover” by definition make false statements 
of fact to third persons that constitute misrepre-
sentation and deceit. At the very least, such inves-
tigators deceive others about their identities and 
purposes. The lawyer’s investigator, for example, 
would falsely claim to be a computer consultant 
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conducting a computer study in order to deceive the 
complainant and the family. In order to establish 
credibility in other contexts, investigators may make 
false statements about such things as having a prior 
criminal history and connections with criminals.
Vicarious Responsibility. Two other Model 
Rules create vicarious ethical liability for lawyers 
based on the acts of nonlawyers. Both rules apply 
to conduct by a nonlawyer that is inconsistent with 
the professional obligations of a lawyer. Model 
Rule 5.3, entitled Responsibilities Regarding Non-
lawyer Assistants, imposes both obligations and 
responsibilities on lawyers “[w]ith respect to a non-
lawyer employed or retained by or associated with 
a lawyer.” Section (b) requires a lawyer supervising 
such a nonlawyer to “make reasonable efforts to 
ensure” that the nonlawyer’s “conduct is compat-
ible with the professional obligations of the law-
yer.” Section (c) applies to conduct of a nonlawyer 
that would violate the Model Rules “if engaged in 
by a lawyer” and states that the lawyer “shall be 
responsible” for conduct by a nonlawyer assistant 
if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct.
The other rule creating vicarious ethical liabil-
ity is Model Rule 8.4(a): “It is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, know-
ingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another . . . .”
Attorneys, such as our lawyer, who employ 
nonlawyers to conduct undercover investigations, 
fall easily within both Rule 5.3(c) and 8.4(a). An 
investigator hired by a defense lawyer is “em-
ployed, retained by, or associated with” the de-
fense lawyer as required by Model Rule 5.3. And 
such a lawyer knowingly assists and induces the 
investigator, as required by Model Rule 8.4(a), by 
providing information and payment.
The combined operation of Rules 4.1(a), 
5.3(c), and 8.4(a) and (c) gives rise to the question 
of whether the lawyer’s supervision of an investi-
gation involving misrepresentation and deceit is 
unethical. If  one were to rely solely on the text of 
these rules, there would be no question that our 
lawyer’s supervision of investigatory deceit is un-
ethical. The prohibitions on false statements and 
deceit found in Model Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) are 
categorical. Neither rule states any exceptions, 
whether for investigations or any other purpose. 
Should these rules, though, be interpreted 
more narrowly than they are written? Should 
courts and ethics authorities through interpre-
tation create an exception allowing lawyers to 
instigate and supervise investigatory deceit? Or 
should Rule 4.1 or 8.4 be amended explicitly to 
incorporate such an exception, either in the rule’s 
language or a Comment to the rule? Jurisdictions 
have answered yes to each of these questions.
the Arguments
A number of arguments can be advanced for al-
lowing criminal defense lawyers to employ deceit 
in covert investigations. 
Utility. Legal and ethical prohibitions as well 
as moral condemnation of deceit are based in 
part on the harm deceit tends to cause both to 
individuals and society. Unlike typical deception, 
though, investigatory deception by police can be 
useful in revealing truth and falsity. Misrepresen-
tation and deceit by defense investigators is moti-
vated by the same laudable goal as police decep-
tion of ultimately producing some greater truth 
about guilt or innocence. In our fact scenario, for 
example, evidence of the presence of pornogra-
phy on the complainant’s computer would help 
the jury determine the truth about the client’s 
conduct and the complainant’s allegations. A 
defense lawyer may want to employ deception in 
other cases to uncover, prior to trial, misconduct 
or untruthfulness of key witnesses to persuade 
the prosecutor to consider dropping or amending 
charges against the defendant or to impeach the 
witnesses at trial. 
Necessity. Investigatory deception, in addition 
to being useful, is also often necessary in dealing 
with crimes and criminals. Prosecutors and police 
argue quite plausibly that they need to use deceit 
to find the truth because criminal activity tends to 
be clandestine. Crimes, by their very nature, tend 
to be committed covertly since detection leads not 
only to possible punishment but also social con-
demnation. In addition to having a motive to lie, 
those who commit crimes are often seen as having 
poor character relating to veracity, a view reflected 
in our evidentiary rules regarding impeachment. 
Also, many witnesses to crimes such as drug dis-
tribution and organized crime are likely to have a 
powerful motivation to lie out of fear of implica-
tion or retaliation. Again, deception is often neces-
sary to get such people to reveal the truth.
Defense counsel can make the same argu-
ments. Like prosecutors and police, defense law-
yers and their investigators must investigate clan-
destine activity and deal with people likely to lie. 
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If  anything, one might argue that the defense has 
greater need than the prosecution for use of in-
vestigatory deception. The prosecution is able to 
make deals with reluctant witnesses to encourage 
them to come forward and tell the truth. Defense 
counsel does not have this power. 
Symmetry. The language of the bans on mis-
representation and deceit found in Model Rules 
4.1(a) and 8.4(c) is unqualified. They apply to 
prosecutors as well as defense lawyers and lawyers 
in civil practice. Only Florida has amended its 
Rule 8.4(c) explicitly to permit government law-
yers to supervise an undercover investigation. It 
is well recognized, though, that prosecutors regu-
larly supervise and advise police in the use of co-
vert investigations employing misrepresentation 
and deceit to investigate a wide range of crimes, 
a tendency that both the “war on drugs” and the 
“war on terror” have escalated. Despite the cat-
egorical ban on supervising and instigating inves-
tigatory deceit, prosecutors are not disciplined on 
the basis of vicarious ethical responsibility for the 
misrepresentations and deceit of the police and 
informants they advise and supervise. If  prosecu-
tors are thus permitted to supervise investigatory 
deceit, one can argue that simple fairness dictates 
that defense lawyers be allowed to do the same.
Image of the Profession. One concern with ap-
proving of criminal defense lawyers advising and 
supervising investigatory deception is that it will 
have a negative impact on the image of the legal 
profession and the criminal justice system. But, is 
public response likely to be different to defense as 
opposed to prosecutorial supervision of investi-
gatory deceit? One can argue that if  such decep-
tion helps reveal truth and decrease the number 
of convictions of the innocent, the public re-
sponse to such deceit might well be positive. 
A Slippery Slope. Another argument against 
allowing investigatory deception is that once ly-
ing is allowed, it will be hard to set and enforce 
boundaries on it. If  defense lawyers, for example, 
are allowed to use deception in the investigatory 
phase of a criminal case because it is useful and 
necessary in revealing truth, why not allow law-
yers to use deception inside the courtroom based 
on the same rationales? 
Amended ethics Rules 
A number of jurisdictions have modified their 
ethics rules in ways that allow our lawyer to uti-
lize investigative deception. States have used two 
approaches to allowing such deception.  
Supervising Covert Activity. Some jurisdictions 
have adopted language explicitly permitting law-
yers to supervise covert investigations. Oregon’s 
version of Rule 8.4 states “[i]t shall not be profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or 
others about or to supervise lawful covert activity 
in the investigation of violations of civil or crimi-
nal law or constitutional rights.” Ohio added a 
Comment explaining that its Rule 8.4(c) “does 
not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advis-
ing about lawful covert activity in the investiga-
tion of criminal activity or violations of consti-
tutional or civil rights when authorized by law.” 
Wisconsin, in response to a case that inspired the 
fact pattern featuring our lawyer at the outset of 
this column, recently added a subsection (c) to its 
Rule 4.1: “Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and 
Rules 5.3(c)(1) and 8.4, a lawyer may advise or 
supervise others with respect to lawful investiga-
tive activities.”
These jurisdictions authorize deceit only in the 
context of investigations and only permit lawyers 
to supervise or advise others, presumably nonlaw-
yers, who engage in deceit. By negative implica-
tion, they appear to prohibit lawyers from per-
sonally engaging in misrepresentation or deceit 
and supervising or advising others who engage in 
deceit outside an investigative context. 
Fitness to Practice Law. Virginia has taken a 
different textual route in dealing with deceit in 
investigations. It modified its version of  8.4(c) 
by restricting its ban to dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation “which reflects ad-
versely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” 
This language is not as clear as the amendments 
described in the previous section in permitting 
the supervision of  covert investigations. It is 
If anything, it might be argued that defense has 
greater need for the use of investigatory deception.
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also broader, since its language appears to allow 
the use of  misrepresentation and deceit outside 
the context of  investigations and allows lawyers 
themselves to engage in acts of  misrepresenta-
tion and deceit, also known as “pretexting,” in 
order to obtain exculpating, impeaching, or mit-
igating evidence or information. 
interpretation of ethics Rules 
As suggested previously, another way to allow 
defense lawyers to use deceit in investigations un-
der unamended versions of the Model Rules is 
for courts and ethics authorities to interpret rules 
such as Model Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) more nar-
rowly than they are written and create exceptions 
allowing lawyers to instigate and supervise inves-
tigatory deceit. In doing so, courts and ethics au-
thorities would be using an “intentionalist” meth-
od of textual interpretation and relying upon the 
purposes and policies underlying the ethics rules 
to create exceptions that override clear text. 
This happened in Wisconsin prior to amend-
ment of its version of Model Rule 4.1(a). A Wis-
consin case, Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hur-
ley, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, dealt with discipline 
of a lawyer who, in facts similar to those in our 
introductory fact pattern, authorized an investi-
gator to use deception to obtain the complain-
ing witness’s computer. After doing so, a foren-
sic computer expert found pornography on the 
complainant’s computer as the lawyer suspected. 
Soon after the deceptive investigation was re-
vealed, though, disciplinary charges were brought 
against the lawyer.
In Hurley, a referee assigned to make a re-
port and recommendation in the case found the 
lawyer’s use of  investigatory deceit ethically ap-
propriate. She also found that his conduct was 
constitutionally mandated in order for him to 
provide effective assistance of  counsel. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted the 
referee’s report. 
Reasons for caution
Despite the trend toward approval of defense use 
of investigative deceit, defense lawyers need to be 
cautious. The ethics rules of most jurisdictions still 
set forth an unqualified ban on false statements and 
deceit and it is uncertain how those rules will be in-
terpreted. Even in jurisdictions that have explicitly 
approved such deceit, there is ambiguity. Florida 
has explicitly modified its version of Rule 8.4(c) to 
allow government lawyers to supervise undercover 
investigations. Does the fact that the rule mentions 
only government lawyers mean that defense law-
yers cannot supervise such investigations? New 
York Ethics Opinion 737 (2007) approves limited 
deceit in the investigation of “civil rights or intel-
lectual property” cases, but is silent on criminal 
cases. Also if defense lawyers choose to supervise 
undercover investigations, they need to be careful 
not to violate either the law or other ethics provi-
sions, such as the anticontact rule, which prohibits 
contact with a represented person.
conclusion 
We think the trend in favor of openly allowing 
lawyers to supervise undercover investigations is 
generally a positive one. In addition to the fair-
ness of giving criminal defense lawyers the same 
investigatory tools prosecutors use, it recognizes 
that criminal defense lawyers often face the same 
barriers to uncovering the truth as police and 
prosecutors. In addition, we think that investiga-
tions such as the one done in the Hurley case not 
only help uncover the truth, but are unlikely if  
publicized, to generate a negative public reaction. 
We would encourage courts and ethics author-
ities, though, to consider placing two limitations 
on such investigations: (1) that the lawyer have a 
reasonable basis for suspecting the investigative 
deceit will uncover information important to the 
case; and (2) that nondeceptive alternatives for 
obtaining the information are either unavailable 
or unlikely to be successful. n
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